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Corruption in Bank Lending: The Role of Timely Loan Loss Provisioning 
 
Abstract 
Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of country-
level timely loan loss provisioning by banks on such corruption using a unique World Bank 
dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evidence consistent with 
timely loan loss provisions constraining lending corruption because it increases the likelihood of 
problem loans being uncovered earlier. This result is robust to using the tax-deductibility of loan 
loss provisions as an instrumental variable. In further analysis, we find timely loan loss 
provisioning less associated with reduced corruption in countries with deposit insurance schemes 
and significant government ownership in the banking system. This evidence is consistent with 
timely loan loss provisioning being less of a deterrent on lending corruption when banks are less 
disciplined by their capital providers (depositors and investors).  
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1. Introduction 
Banks provide a significant portion of firm financing and play an important role in 
economic development. Lending corruption is one of the major reasons for problem loans in 
many countries (Adams and Probe International, 1991; Lardy, 1998; Udell, 1989). Loans 
involving corruption are typically lower quality loans that may not have been approved 
otherwise and are, therefore, more likely to go bad. These loans are approved because the loan 
officer, while enjoying private benefits from the corruption, does not believe she will bear the 
full cost of the potentially bad loan. Hence, corruption in lending might be regarded as a classic 
agency problem where the agent (loan officer or manager) extracts private benefits at the 
expense of the principal (e.g., depositors, investors, etc.).  
Lending corruption as a prevalent phenomenon reduces the banking system’s efficiency 
in distributing scarce capital. Prior studies have examined various institutional factors—bank 
supervisory policies, competition among banks, information sharing about borrowers, and the 
media—that could help mitigate such corruption (Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song, 2009; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2011). While these papers generally 
offer evidence that external monitoring deters lending corruption, no study has examined 
specifically how the provisioning for bad loans in a country can act to prevent corruption. 
Loan loss provisioning is an important accrual process through which banks recognize 
future expected loan losses in the current period. Banks make provisions to capture expected 
losses and these provisions immediately reduce bank profits and regulatory capital, which, in 
turn, can warn the board, managers, and external stakeholders of problems facing the banks.1 The 
provisions go into a loan loss reserve from which future actual losses are deducted. As part of the 
                                                            
1 The importance of accruing for loan losses can be seen from the numerous banking studies that have examined the 
implications of loan loss provisioning. See the survey by Beatty and Liao (2014) and discussion by Bushman (2014). 
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typical internal control process to ensure proper recording and prevent fraud and cover-ups, 
accounting for the loans, including provisions, is handled by the bank accountants and not the 
lending officers. In fact, the separation of duties between those engaging in and those accounting 
for the transactions is a common practice in many organizations.2 Bank examiners and auditors 
likely increase pressure on internal bank accountants to be diligent about recording timely loss 
provisions (Dahl et al., 1998).  
A key feature of loan loss provisioning, especially more timely loan loss provisioning, is 
that it serves as an early warning mechanism about the problem loans (including those arising 
from lending corruption) that a bank has. Therefore, stakeholders can better monitor and exert 
discipline on the bank’s behavior (Bushman, 2014), and the corrupt bank personnel have less 
time or chance to conceal and/or escape with the gains from engaging in lending corruption. 
Hence, in anticipation of the sequence of events that could be triggered by earlier loan loss 
provisions, loan officers are more likely to refrain from lending corruption at loan origination.    
To measure corruption, we follow prior studies (Barth et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2006; 
Houston et al., 2011) that have examined issues related to corruption in bank lending by utilizing 
the World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey (WBES).3 In particular, the survey 
includes the question: “Is the corruption of banking officials an obstacle for the operation and 
growth of your business?” We rely on the response by firms (borrowers or potential borrowers) 
to measure the degree of bank lending corruption. To measure the timeliness of loan loss 
provisioning within a country, we follow Bushman and Williams (2012). Their proxy quantifies 
                                                            
2 If internal control systems are weak, managers, even loan officers, may be able to influence the recording of 
financial data (Wickberg 2013). An essential part of assessing the internal controls is the examination of the proper 
separation of duties. 
3 As noted by Houston et al. (2011) and other studies, the relative lack of papers on bank corruption is not surprising 
given the difficulty of measuring bank corruption. The recent literature essentially relies on the survey by the World 
Bank to gauge lending corruption. 
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how well the country’s systematic loan loss provisions capture next period’s deterioration in loan 
portfolio quality while controlling for current and previous changes in portfolio quality, bank 
characteristics, and changes in macroeconomic conditions. An advantage of measuring bank 
lending corruption based on responses by firms and country-level corruption based on the 
financial reports of banks is that it reduces endogeneity concerns as the information obtained 
from two different parties are used to examine the relation between the two constructs of interest. 
The merging of the data on banking corruption, the timeliness of loan loss provisioning, 
and other variables results in a sample of 3,611 firms from 44 countries. Controlling for the 
general level of corruption, financing obstacles, various dimensions of the firms’ information 
environments, and a number of other aspects of the firm and bank environments and the 
economy, we document that more timely systematic loan loss provisioning is incrementally 
associated with less lending corruption. These results are robust to the inclusion of an extensive 
array of control variables and alternative measures of timeliness of loan loss provisions. Hence, 
the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that timely loan loss provisioning serves as an 
early warning mechanism that deters bank corruption. 
In an attempt to identify the effect of timely loan loss provisioning on lending corruption, 
we employ a two stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable approach with the 
instrumental variable being the corporate tax rate if the loan loss provision is tax deductible for a 
particular country.  We argue that while a higher corporate tax rate provides incentives to make 
earlier loan loss provisions because it reduces the amount of near-term cash outflows to the tax 
authorities, it is unlikely to directly influence an individual’s decision to engage in bribe taking. 
In the 2SLS regressions, we find robust evidence indicating that more timely loan loss provisions 
reduce lending corruption.  
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Next, we examine the institutional features related to the strength of market discipline 
and test whether these features affect the association between timely loan loss provisioning and 
lending corruption. In particular, we focus on two major capital providers for banks, depositors 
and government.4 We argue that deposit insurance reduces the incentives of depositors to 
monitor the banks and to withdraw their deposits in the event that it is revealed that banks are 
suffering from significant loan losses (Billet et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; 
Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002; Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007). We also argue that government 
ownership increases the likelihood that the bank will be bailed out in the event that it is in trouble 
due to problem loans. Other equity investors are less likely to closely monitor the bank due to the 
possible bailout (Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Li et al., 2009; Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar, 
2009; Wang et al., 2008). In line with these arguments, we find evidence that more timely loan 
loss provisioning is less negatively associated with lending corruption in banking systems with 
deposit insurance and with more government ownership of the banking system. Collectively, the 
results further enhance our confidence in interpreting the main effect, as it is more difficult to 
conceive an alternative story that simultaneously explains our primary results and interaction 
effects (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013). 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the corruption 
literature, which does not typically consider informative financial reporting practices, such as 
banks’ timely loan loss provisioning, as a deterrent to corruption (Barth et al., 2009; Beck et al., 
2006; Houston et al., 2011).5 These accrued loan losses, if recorded in a more timely fashion, can 
                                                            
4 Governments are major investors in the banking systems in many developing countries, which are the focus of the 
World Bank survey data used in this study. 
5 Ferraz and Finan (2008) is a somewhat related study that examines the effect of disclosing information about 
corruption practices on electoral accountability; this information is based on government audits of municipalities. 
They find the release of audit outcomes has a significant impact on incumbents’ electoral performance, and that 
these effects were more pronounced in municipalities where local radio was present to divulge the information. 
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provide useful warnings of potential problems to outside monitors. Hence, banks provide a 
powerful setting to examine the role of financial reporting in disciplining corruption. To the best 
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the effect of financial reporting, particularly 
timely loan loss provisioning, on corruption in the banking sector. 
Second, we contribute to the literature of the real effects of more timely loan loss 
provisioning (e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2011; Bushman and Williams, 2012). Beatty and Liao (2011) 
show that more timely loan loss provisioning is linked to a greater willingness to lend during a 
financial crisis because earlier recognition of credit losses means less credit losses have to be 
recognized during recessionary periods when regulatory capital declines and external financial 
frictions increase.6 Bushman and Williams (2012) find that more timely loan loss provisioning 
reduces inappropriate risk taking. Our study suggests that the disciplining effect of  more timely 
loan provisioning on lending corruption is another reason to expect such provisioning to bring 
about more lending efficiency in the banking industry. As noted in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), 
Mauro (1995), and many other studies, corruption plays an important role in resource allocation, 
especially in less developed countries, and is costly to economic development.  
Finally, our findings that more timely loan loss provisioning is associated with less 
lending corruption can inform standard setters. Recently, there has been debate over whether the 
incurred or expected loss model is the more appropriate loan loss provisioning model. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) proposes a new accounting model (the expected 
loss model), which is intended to require more timely recognition credit losses (FASB, 2012). 
Moreover, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, 2014) issued the finalized 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Unlike Ferraz and Finan (2008), we focus directly on how disclosure through financial reporting can impact 
corruption, as opposed to how disclosure about corruption can impact elections. 
6 Since credit losses reduce Tier 1 capital, their earlier recognition means there is less need to take losses that reduce 
Tier 1 capital at a time when capital is more constrained.  
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version of IFRS 9, which incorporates a new expected loss impairment model. While we are not 
able to directly test these models, to the extent that the expected loss model results in more 
timely loan loss provisioning, our paper provides some support for the beneficial effects of 
adopting the expected loss model. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses. 
Section 3 introduces the data and measures. Section 4 covers the empirical analyses on bank 
corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions. Section 5 details some robustness analyses, 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1 Lending corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions 
Corruption plays a role in the lending process around the world, and can lead to severe 
consequences across countries (e.g., Barth et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2006; Tanzi, 1998). For 
example, in September of 2014, the Indian government fired the chairman of the state-run 
Syndicate Bank for taking bribes for loans.7 On August 4, 2013, India’s Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) arrested the chairman of Syndicate Bank over allegations he was seeking 
bribes to favor debtors.8 The CBI recovered 5 million rupees that a New Delhi-based company 
allegedly paid, via middlemen, to the bank's head for a loan extension. The same month, the 
former head of one of China’s largest banks, Postal Savings Bank of China, was charged with 
corruption offences, including making illegal loans and bribery.9 This high profile arrest 
followed a 2010 case, in which a former vice-president of the China Development Bank was 
                                                            
7 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Govt-sacks-suspended-Syndicate-Bank-
chief/articleshow/43223687.cms. 
8 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/india-probes-bank-loan-to/1305934.html. 
9 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/14/content_18307135.htm. 
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given a suspended death sentence for receiving bribes in exchange for helping companies get 
loans.10 Consistent with lending corruption being a problem in China, Chen et al. (2013) present 
evidence congruent with bribery being a primary factor in private firms’ ability to access debt 
capital from any but the country’s four largest banks.  
While the headline-grabbing news stories tend to relate to corruption by top bank 
officials, it is important to remember that lending corruption also occurs at lower levels. Loan 
officers and managers can engage in arrangements to receive kickbacks from clients in various 
forms. For example, they can ask for bribes to approve a loan or collude with clients to obtain 
bogus loans and subsequently share in the proceeds. Udell (1989) notes that evaluations of many 
failed banks reveal kickbacks to loan officers. In a less extreme case of corruption, the loan 
officer may see the borrower as a possible future employer and be more lenient in granting a loan. 
Given the potentially harmful consequences of lending corruption, it is important to have 
mechanisms in place to curtail corrupt lending practices. Earlier papers on such mechanisms 
have focused on the role of external mechanisms in mitigating lending corruption. Beck et al. 
(2006) find that bank supervisory policies that empower private monitoring reduce lending 
corruption but do not find evidence that empower supervisory agencies does. Barth et al. (2009) 
show that greater competition among banks and information sharing by private bureaus does the 
same. Houston et al. (2011) find that state ownership of the media and media concentration are 
associated with more lending corruption. In this paper, we argue that financial reporting, 
particularly more timely loan loss provisioning, plays a fundamental role in deterring banking 
corruption because of the information asymmetry between the banks and various stakeholders.11  
                                                            
10 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-04/16/content_9738250.htm. 
11 The timeliness of loan loss provisioning is distinct from the concept of financial reporting accuracy because the 
regulatory standards underlying loan loss provisioning do not prescribe how timely the loan provisions must be. In 
particular, they do not specify the amount of loan loss provisions in the current period for each dollar of anticipated 
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To illustrate the role of timely loan loss provisioning in deterring lending corruption, we 
use a corrupt bank lending setting, similar to Barth et al. (2009). Barth et al. (2009) depict 
corrupt bank lending as a private negotiation between the bribe taker (lending officer) and the 
bribe payer (the borrowing firm). The bribe increases the income of the lending officer. However, 
the lending officer also has to weigh this benefit against the cost of being caught and penalized. 
Not only does she have to consider the likelihood of being caught, she also has to consider when 
this may occur because being caught early limits opportunities to obtain more bribes, as well as 
the chance to leave the bank before the bad loans are revealed.  
As noted by Barth et al. (2009, p. 365), “Bribery, of course, could be detected and thus 
punished by the bank manager and/or regulators, in which case the loan officer will be penalized 
(e.g., demoted, fined, and/or even face more stringent legal sanctions).” More timely reporting of 
loan losses increases the likelihood of being caught early because the bank recognizes losses 
even before the loans turn bad. The separation of duties within a bank (or any other type of 
organization) is an important form of internal control which makes it hard for a corrupt loan 
officer to hide the loan losses. In fact, an important principle in accounting in many 
organizations, not just banks, is that the person doing the accounting should not be the person 
handling the transactions (e.g., Trenerry, 1999;  Pickett, 2001). Further, external and internal 
auditors, who ensure that the loan loss provisions are appropriately made, should be as 
independent as possible from both parties. In the case of a bank, the loan officer (or even the 
higher-level executive, especially for larger loans) granting the loan should not also be the 
person doing the accounting for the loan, which includes documenting the loan and recording 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
increase in non-performing loans or chargeoffs in the future period(s) (Beatty and Liao, 2011; Bushman and 
Williams, 2012). 
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any loan loss provisions. Bank regulators also focus on separation of duties and adequacy of the 
loan loss provisions when examining the banks.12  
Any detection of an improper separation of duties will increase the extent of the 
examination efforts. Furthermore, these parties could require the banks to record additional loan 
loss provisions should they deem the provisions inadequate given the nature of the non-
performing loans that the bank has. Although the loan officer may be able to hide losses for a 
while on loans issued to poor quality borrowers who only obtained loans through bribery, 
lending officers cannot hide loan portfolio losses indefinitely. Eventually, the losses will be 
uncovered and accounted for through provisions and charge-offs. Accountants, external auditors, 
and bank supervisors have the authority to identify and force earlier recognition of impaired 
loans in the form of provisions (Gaston and Song 2014). 
More timely loan provisions will draw earlier attention to a bank’s problem loans. The 
negative impact on profitability and bank regulatory capital will also occur earlier, which in turn 
is likely to trigger earlier scrutiny of the bank by various stakeholders, including internal and 
external monitors. This early scrutiny increases the likelihood of earlier discovery and 
penalization of corrupt lending. Ex-ante, as we have argued earlier, this will constrain corruption. 
Hence, to the extent that on average, systematic lending corruption results in loans that are more 
likely to be non-performing, more timely loan loss provisioning will result in earlier detection of 
                                                            
12 According to a bank regulator we contacted about bank examinations, it is common for regulators to check that a 
bank has documented procedures to ensure proper separation of duties and also to talk with bank personnel to ensure 
the procedures are followed. With regard to loans, the regulators will ask for the customer loan files, analyze the 
condition of the customers based on information in these files (e.g., financial statements provided by customers and 
loan repayment records) and other information (e.g., information known about the customers via other bank 
examinations), and ensure that the bank has made adequate provisions for potential loan losses. The bank’s track 
record in making adequate provisions for loan losses is an important consideration in determining whether it is likely 
making appropriate provisions for the current loans.   
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loans obtained through corruption.13 This limits officers from benefitting from corrupt lending 
over a long period of time and/or escaping with their ill-gotten gains.14 Thus, we argue that more 
timely loan loss provisions will discourage lending corruption ex ante because lending officers 
realize this greatly reduces their expected payoffs from engaging in corruption.  
The effectiveness of more timely loan loss provisioning in reducing lending corruption 
might be mitigated by the possibility that the corrupt bank officers are able to manipulate the 
loan review process into treating the non-performing corrupt bank loans as performing loans. In 
this case, more timely loan provisioning has no effect in deterring bank corruption because no 
loan loss provisions have to be made at any time for performing loans. The separation of duties 
within the whole loan process and external examination by bank auditors and regulators also 
make it difficult for non-performing loans to stay hidden, at least for long. The bank employees 
making/approving the loans are not typically the same as those who review the loans to establish 
provisions (Udell, 1989). While collusion among employees is possible, there is always the 
likelihood that the collusion breaks down or is uncovered. When faced with more timely loan 
loss provisioning, the lending officer might be less inclined to engage in corrupt lending, ex ante. 
Hence, our main hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H1: More timely loan loss provisioning reduces corruption in bank lending. 
2.2 The role of market discipline 
                                                            
13 In fact, many cases of corporate misbehavior (e.g., fraud, accounting manipulation, and executive excesses) have 
been uncovered because of problems first reflected in corporate reports. Regulators, auditors, analysts, and other 
stakeholders scrutinize unusual patterns in reported numbers (across time for the firm or in comparison with other 
firms) to identify possible underlying problems, which may then trigger further investigations. 
14 Corrupt individuals often have short horizons and plan to flee with their ill-gotten gains before they are detected. 
For example, as part of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, the Communist Party’s Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection, in an operation labelled “Fox Hunt 2014,” set up a dedicated office to investigate allegedly 
corrupt officials who had absconded or sent relatives and assets abroad. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10991255/China-launches-global-fox-hunt-for-corrupt-
officials.html 
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 We focus on the interaction between market discipline and timely loan loss provisions as 
Beck et al. (2006) find strategies intended to enhance stakeholders’ private monitoring of banks 
are more successful in constraining lending corruption than strategies empowering supervisory 
agencies. Two key sources of capital for banks are deposits and equity funding. These two 
sources contribute to a large part of banks’ total assets. To the extent that timely loan loss 
provisioning reveals earlier loan losses, such as from lending corruption, it can adversely affect 
the banks. Because timely loan loss provisions indicate when the loan portfolio becomes riskier, 
capital providers, specifically depositors and investors, might withdraw capital or at least be 
unwilling to provide more of it, especially in times when the bank needs more capital to offset 
the loan losses. All of these negative consequences give rise to further investigation, which 
potentially uncovers corruption and imposes penalties on corrupt individuals. The negative 
consequences (to banks and corrupt individuals) are pivotal to the market discipline mechanism. 
 In this section, we focus on how mitigated market discipline by capital providers could 
affect the relation between timely loan loss provisioning and lending corruption. The general 
intuition is that when banks are more concerned about market discipline arising from loan losses, 
particularly the earlier revelation of losses due to timely loan loss provisioning, bank managers 
and officers are more likely to refrain from lending corruption. When lenders are less concerned 
about this discipline, they are more likely to engage in lending corruption.  
2.2.1  The role of deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance exists because of the concern that market discipline by uninsured 
depositors may be too risky. Depositors may over-discipline banks by withdrawing funds from 
solvent banks, fearing their money is not safe. Furthermore, some argue that a contagion effect 
exists among banks because of shared systematic risk in their asset portfolios (Greenbaum and 
12 
 
Thakor, 2007). Thus, when one bank fails, depositors assume the failure is because of systematic 
risks applicable to other banks, which can lead to a bank panic. In the U.S., deposit insurance 
was originally offered through private clearing house arrangements established by bank 
syndicates. However, the private arrangements could not eliminate the threat of bank runs 
because the diversification they provided was limited by the size of the group of member banks 
and there was no assurance of the complete integrity of the arrangements (Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 2007). Therefore, the federal government began to provide deposit insurance in 1933. 
While the actual scheme of the insurance varies, many countries now provide some form of 
federal deposit insurance in the hope of promoting greater bank stability (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004).   
Despite the potential benefits of deposit insurance, it has introduced a new source of 
moral hazard. Merton (1977) shows that deposit insurance can be viewed as a put option on bank 
assets and banks that have it can increase their value by increasing risk.15 Depositors’ concern 
with bank performance is decreasing in deposit insurance. Specifically, when banks have 
insurance, depositors will be less concerned about whether corrupt lending results in bad loans 
since they do not bear the cost of these losses if the loans fail. Hence, deposit insurance may 
decrease market discipline for banks. While it has been suggested that outside stakeholders 
cannot properly differentiate the risks undertaken by bank managers, evidence exists to the 
contrary (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). In fact, prior literature finds deposit insurance decreases 
market discipline on risk taking for banks (Billet et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
                                                            
15 Even in the U.S., where deposit insurance premiums have been related to risk since the 1980s, there is a limited 
number of risk categories and the premiums are only weakly related to risk for most banks (Greenbaum and Thakor, 
2007). 
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2004; Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002; Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007).16 Maechler and McDill 
(2006) find evidence suggesting that the depositor discipline constrains managerial risk taking. 
In an international study, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find deposit insurance actually 
increases the likelihood of a bank crisis and that this effect is increasing in coverage when 
funded by the government. Berger and Turk-Ariss (2014) find significant depositor discipline 
prior to the crisis in both the U.S. and the EU. However, this discipline declined during the crisis 
except for small U.S. banks, consistent with depositors responding to actions taken by the 
government at the beginning of the crisis reducing this discipline.  
Hence, when depositors do not exert market discipline on banks because they are 
protected by deposit insurance, bank officers (and managers) are less likely to be concerned 
about being punished after loan losses are revealed. In particular, if reported loan losses result in 
a bank run because depositors fear the loss of their deposits, the board of directors, top 
management, and/or regulators are more likely to step in and investigate the problems at the bank. 
This could lead to staff turnover and even criminal prosecution in the event that corruption is 
uncovered. Ex ante, in a banking system with a higher likelihood of a bank run due to no deposit 
insurance and an accounting system that results in more timely loan loss provisioning, bank 
officers are less likely to risk making bad loans in return for some personal benefits. Hence, our 
next hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H2a:  More timely loan loss provisioning reduces corruption in bank lending less in 
banking systems with deposit insurance.  
2.2.2 Government ownership in the banking system 
                                                            
16 Although earlier models of deposit insurance often find it to be an optimal policy, for example, Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), they also acknowledge that it is a significant source of moral hazard (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002).  
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Shleifer and Vishny (1993) find the structure of government institutions to be important 
determinants of corruption. Governments are less likely to allow a firm in which they hold a 
greater ownership stake to fail. Many studies in the literature compare state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to non-SOEs and find that SOEs have lower costs of debt (Borisova and Megginson, 
2011) and higher leverage (Li et al., 2009), are less likely to have Big Four auditors (Guedhami 
et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2008), and experience a less pronounced impact of audit quality on 
earnings management and cost of capital (Chen et al., 2011b).17 Also, Calomiris et al. (2008) find 
a negative market reaction to unexpected decreased levels of government ownership of SOEs.  
All of these results are consistent with market participants believing governments implicitly 
guarantee SOEs.18 
Hence, to the extent that more government ownership reduces the likelihood that banks 
will be allowed to fail, it will weaken market discipline for bad behavior like corruption and 
excessive risk taking (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Stern and Feldman, 
2004). So even when banks have to accrue loan losses in anticipation of loans turning bad – 
accrued losses that lower earnings and reduce regulatory capital – banks are likely to receive 
support/bailouts from the government to stay afloat, even if the economically optimal decision is 
to let the bank fail. For example, the government might pump in additional capital or make it 
easier/cheaper for banks to borrow from the central bank. As a result, when bank managers and 
officers anticipate that any negative consequences will be mitigated by government support, they 
are more likely to engage in corrupt behavior – even if there is more timely reporting of the 
losses.  
                                                            
17 Chaney et al. (2011) find that politically connected firms have poorer accounting quality than other firms because 
they do not feel pressure to respond to market forces for higher quality accounting. 
18 Note that the literature does not suggest that these results are from superior operations. In fact, SOEs are found to 
have lower Tobin’s Q (Wei et al., 2005) and less investment efficiency than other firms (Chen et al., 2011a). 
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The increased probability of a bank surviving due to governmental support is important 
to the corrupt bank manager for a number of reasons. First, it increases the likelihood that the 
manager can avoid losing his job and continue to benefit from past and future corrupt behavior. 
Second, it reduces the likelihood that there will be extensive investigations (e.g., due to public 
pressure) into the problems that led to the bank failure, investigations that may uncover 
corruption. Note that the above argument does not require the bank manager to expect his corrupt 
behavior to be uncovered. All the anticipated government support has to do is to increase the net 
present value of his gains from his corrupt and non-corrupt actions (e.g., wages) because of the 
lack of market discipline over the negative economic consequences of his corrupt behavior. 
 Government ownership can also increase the likelihood that bad loans or the underlying 
lending corruption will be covered up, even if reported loan losses result in investigations that 
reveal the corruption. Specifically, it is unclear that punishment will be meted out against the 
wrongdoers because of bureaucracy, political protection/patronage, and cover-ups, which may be 
more prevalent when governments have a significant stake in a firm (Dinç, 2005). Gerschenkron 
(1962, p. 20) notes, “there is no doubt that the government as an agens movens of 
industrialization discharged in a role in a far less than perfectly efficient manner. Incompetence 
and corruption of bureaucracy were great.” The lack of punishment further increases the net 
present value of the gains from corruption. 
Houston et al. (2011) provide some initial evidence that government bank ownership 
moderates the effect of the information environment on lending corruption. Arguing that state 
ownership of the media weakens its ability to expose and deter corruption, they first document 
that state ownership of the media is positively associated with lending corruption. They then 
provide further evidence that this positive association is stronger in countries with a state-
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controlled banking sector.  Similar to Houston et al. (2011), we argue that more timely loan loss 
provisioning is less likely to have a deterrent effect in a state-controlled banking system that 
discourages following up on the discovery of lending corruption.  Our final hypothesis, stated in 
the alternative firm, is: 
H2b: More timely loan loss provisioning reduces corruption in bank lending less in 
countries where the government holds a more significant stake in the banking system. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Data sources 
 Our data come from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) (2000), 
Bankscope, and a variety of previous international studies. The WBES data are from firm-level 
surveys conducted across an assortment of industries in different countries, many of them 
developing countries. The survey is completed by managers, accountants, directors, and other 
employees. It is conducted by independent contractors, and the firm identity is kept confidential 
to ensure unbiased responses. The WBES data have been used in a number of previously 
published academic articles (Barth et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2005, 2006, 2008; Houston et al., 
2011), and prior research has argued for and conducted validity tests of the survey results, 
specifically on financing obstacles due to the corruption of banking officials (Barth et al., 2009; 
Beck et al., 2006). Our measure for lending corruption and firm controls are taken from this 
source. 
 We use Bankscope to calculate loan loss provision timeliness. Finally, many of our other 
control variables are taken from prior international studies whose authors have graciously made 
their data available. The source for each variable used in our study is listed in Appendix A. After 
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dropping observations missing the necessary control variables, our final sample is composed of 
3,611 firms from 44 countries. 
3.2  Measure of timely loan loss provisioning 
 Using Bankscope’s annual data on banks spanning 1995-2006, we estimate loan loss 
provision timeliness (LLP Timeliness) by country, following Bushman and Williams (2012).19 It 
is estimated from the following regression:20 
ܮܮ ௧ܲ௝ ൌ 	 ߛ଴ ൅	ߛଵܧܾ݈݈݌௧௝ ൅	ߛଶΔܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝ ൅	ߛଷΔܰܲܮ௧௝ ൅	ߛସΔܰܲܮ௧ିଵ௝ ൅ ߛହΔܰܲܮ௧ିଶ௝ ൅
	ߛ଺ܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ௝ ൅	ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௧ିଵ௝ ൅	ߛ଼%Δܩܦ ௧ܲ௝ ൅	߳௧௝,	      (1) 
where ܮܮ ௧ܲ௝ is the loan loss provision scaled by lagged total loans for bank j in year t. ܧܾ݈݈݌௧௝ is 
earnings before loan loss provisions and taxes for period t scaled by lagged total loans. 
Δܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝ is the change in non-performing loans over the period t+1 scaled by lagged total 
assets. Following Bushman and Williams (2012), LLP Timeliness is measured using estimates of 
ߛଶ, which captures how loan loss provisions predict future changes in loan portfolio 
performances while controlling for current and past deteriorations.21 The other variables in the 
regression (equity capital to total assets, the natural logarithm of total assets, and the percentage 
change in GDP) are intended to control for the non-discretionary fundamentals associated with 
loan losses. We estimate equation (1) by country. Similar to Bushman and Williams (2012), we 
assign a value of zero to LLP Timeliness if the coefficient on Δܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝, ߛଶ,	for a particular 
country is not statistically different from zero.  
                                                            
19 To the best of our knowledge, Bushman and William (2012) is the only published study that has examined the role 
of loan loss provision timeliness across different countries. 
20 We choose the period straddling the survey year (WBES, 2000) to enhance the power of estimating the timeliness 
of the loan loss provisions. We also assess the robustness of our results by using data from 1995-1999 (Section 4).   
21 The Δܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝  is likely to be correlated with future loan losses more generally, and using this variable is a 
parsimonious way of capturing provisioning for those future losses without losing too many observations by 
requiring more than one year ahead changes in non-performing loans. 
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Table 1 presents ߛଶ,  LLP Timeliness, and the number of bank-year observations across 
countries. The mean of ߛଶ is 0.016 compared to an average of 0.017 from Bushman and 
Williams (2012). The correlation coefficient between our LLP Timeliness estimates and their 
reported estimates is 0.67 (p<0.01).22 We find that ߛଶ is significantly different from zero in 29 of 
our 44 sample countries and see substantial variation in the measure across those countries. At 
the extreme end of a lack of timeliness of loan loss provisioning is a system in which loan losses 
are recognized only when the loans turn bad and are written off.23  
3.3 Measure of lending corruption 
Our measure of lending corruption (ܤܽ݊݇	ܥ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊) is taken from the response of 
firms (current or potential borrowers) to the WBES survey question: “Is the corruption of 
banking officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?” The possible firm 
responses were 1 – no obstacle, 2 – a minor obstacle, 3 – a moderate obstacle, 4 – a major 
obstacle. Thus, the variable is increasing in the perceived severity of lending corruption. Beck et 
al. (2006, p. 2136-2137) provide an extensive justification for this measure.24 Hence, we believe 
it to be a reasonable proxy for capturing lending corruption. 
One possible limitation of our study is that we only have ܤܽ݊݇	ܥ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ for the year 
2000. Unfortunately, subsequent iterations of the WBES survey do not ask about lending 
corruption as a firm obstacle. However, corruption in the lending process is likely to vary little 
over short periods of time.  While we would like to examine the variable in a changes 
                                                            
22 In an untabulated regression of (1) pooled across all countries in our sample, we find the signs and significance of 
the coefficients comparable to those reported in Bushman and Williams (2012). 
23 Such a system is actually used for tax purposes in many countries (e.g., the United States). Taxable income can 
only be reduced by loan losses when the loan losses are charged off. 
24 A wide range of prior work shows this survey data on financing obstacles is generally correlated with firm growth, 
institutions, corruption, property rights, information sharing, and investment flow efficiency (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2005; Djankov et al., 2003; Hellman et al., 2000). 
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specification, it is quite probable we would not have been able to do so even with a time series of 
observations because of its likely persistence. 
3.4 Summary statistics 
 Table 2 shows the distribution of firms in our sample by country. The sample is primarily 
comprised of developing countries, which is where we expect to find greater variation in lending 
corruption.25 We observe a large variation in mean Bank corruption across countries ranging 
from 3.308 (Thailand) to 1.045 (U.K.). Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics. Bank 
corruption for our sample averages 1.723, compared to 1.776 from Barth et al. (2009), consistent 
with the firms in our sample on average reporting bank corruption as a minor obstacle. 
Nevertheless, we observe a considerable variation in bank corruption, with a standard deviation 
of 1.032. Our country-level control variables have similar means to those in Barth et al. (2009). 
 
4. Empirical design and results 
4.1 Empirical design 
To test H1, we follow the tests (Table 8) from Barth et al. (2009) because these tests 
contain their most comprehensive specifications. Note that this specification includes a series of 
macro and institutional indices not included in their primary tests to assure the robustness of their 
results.26 We add our measure of timely loan loss provisioning and estimate the following 
specification using an ordered probit regression. Using linear specifications does not change the 
study’s inferences.  
ܤܽ݊݇	ܥ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ߙ ൅	ߚଵܮܮܲ	݈ܶ݅݉݁݅݊݁ݏݏ୲ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅	߳௧,     (2) 
                                                            
25 The WBES does not sample many firms in more developed countries such as the United States and Canada. Thus, 
our sample includes a fewer number of observations from these countries, despite there (generally) being more 
banks available in these countries for calculating LLP Timeliness.  
26 We essentially follow Barth et al.’s (2009) Table 8, column 1. When following other specifications in columns 2-6, 
we obtain similar results with a smaller sample size. For reasons of brevity, we do not tabulate them.   
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where Bank Corruption is the firm-level response about how much of an obstacle lending 
corruption is. LLP Timeliness is a country-level measure calculated as described in Section 3.2.  
We follow Barth et al. (2009) and include controls to capture the general information 
environment (Public registry, Private bureau, and Firm auditing) and bank ownership (Private 
bank ownership and Foreign bank ownership). We also include a number of controls for firm 
respondent characteristics (Government, Foreign, Competitor, Firm size, and Exporter). 
Moreover, we control for individual firms’ perception of their legal environments (Fair court 
and Law enforcement). Following Beck et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2009), we include overall 
financing obstacles as an additional control variable (General financial obstacle) based on the 
firm’s response to the question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of 
your business?” (1―no obstacle, 2―a minor obstacle, 3―a moderate obstacle, 4―a major 
obstacle). As both studies point out, incorporating this control variable enables us to establish 
that the link we find is with corruption, not with overall complaints about the financial sector. 
Aggregating these firm-level responses to run cross-country studies may confound interpretation 
of the results because firm composition varies markedly across countries and firm characteristics 
are correlated with survey results (Beck et al., 2006).  
We further control for different aspects of the banking sector (Creditor rights, Deposit 
insurance, and Bank accounting disclosure), overall control of corruption in the economy 
(Control of corruption), and more general country-level characteristics (GDP per capita, 
Inflation, Government effectiveness, Rule of law, Voice and accountability, Democracy, and 
Openness). We refer readers to Appendix A for definitions and sources of variables used. 
Standard errors are clustered by country in all of our tests. 
4.2. Empirical results 
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4.2.1 The relation between timely loan loss provisioning and lending corruption 
 Table 4, Panel A presents our primary results examining whether loan loss provisioning 
reduces bank lending corruption. Column 1 (column 2) presents the results without (with) LLP 
Timeliness. In column 2, which is the main regression specification for this paper, we find that 
the coefficient on LLP Timeliness is -0.371 (t-stat = 2.13). In column 2, we observe negative 
coefficients on Private bureau and Firm auditing, consistent with Barth et al.’s (2009) 
conclusion that having a better information environment and verified disclosure deters lending 
corruption.  Government and Law enforcement enter negatively, in line with Barth et al.’s (2009) 
findings that government owned borrowers and borrowers perceiving a better legal environment 
experience less lending corruption. General financing obstacle, Exporter, and Deposit insurance 
are significantly related to bank corruption as they are in Barth et al. (2009).  
Panel B examines the significance of the economic impact of loan loss provision 
timeliness on lending corruption. We report changes in the probability that a firm rates lending 
corruption as no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, or a major obstacle for 
operations and growth associated with changes in loan loss provision timeliness. A one standard 
deviation increase (decrease) in LLP Timeliness is associated with a 1.0% (2.7%) decrease in the 
probability that a firm rates bank corruption as a major obstacle (no obstacle) to growth. A 
change in LLP Timeliness from the minimum to the maximum is associated with a 6.5% decrease 
(a 17.5% increase) in the probability that a firm rates lending corruption as a major obstacle (not 
an obstacle at all). Given that 11.0% (60.0%) of our sample reports corruption as a major 
obstacle (no obstacle) to growth, this is a sizable result. 
Table 4, Panel B also provides the effects of changes in several of the indicator variables 
from zero to one. Having audited financial statements (a private bureau) leads to a 3.4% (3.2%) 
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decrease in the probability that firms rate lending corruption as a major obstacle and an 8.9% 
(8.7%) increase in firms rating lending corruption as being no obstacle to growth. Having deposit 
insurance leads to a 3.9% increase in probability that a firm cites lending corruption as a major 
obstacle to growth, consistent with Barth et al. (2009) who find a 5.8% increase. Government 
and foreign firm ownership are both associated with decreases in the probability of lending 
corruption being a major obstacle.  
Our primary measure of LLP Timeliness follows Bushman and Williams (2012). To 
check the robustness, we re-estimate our primary results using four alternative measures to LLP 
Timeliness. First, we use ߛଶ estimated in equation (1) without assigning zero to statistically 
insignificant ߛଶ. This will potentially add noise to the LLP Timeliness measure. As expected, we 
obtain weaker results using this variable (Panel C column 1). Our second additional proxy is LLP 
Timeliness estimated from 1995-1999 with the same equation. We estimate this proxy to help 
reduce concerns about the simultaneous determination of LLP Timeliness and Lending 
corruption.27 Our third additional proxy is the incremental R2 from adding Δܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝ to equation 
(1), capturing the additional explanatory power due to adding the one-year-ahead change in non-
performing loans. Our fourth additional proxy is the incremental R2 from adding Δܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝ to 
Beatty and Liao’s (2014) loan loss provision model (see their Table 4, Model (d)).28 Table 4, 
Panel C, column 2 (columns 3 and 4) presents the results with the coefficient on Δܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝ 
(incremental R2 from our base model and from Beatty and Liao, 2014). The distribution of the 
last three of these measures by country is shown in Appendix B. The coefficients with the 
alternative proxies are -1.344 (t-stat = 3.90), -1.159 (t-stat = 2.07), and -1.025 (t-stat = 3.31) in 
                                                            
27 We have fewer sample countries calculating LLP Timeliness over this period because Bankscope’s coverage is 
thinner. 
28 We do not include the Case-Shiller Real Estate Index, which is available only in the United States. 
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columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Hence, our conclusion that more timely loan loss provisioning 
is associated with less lending corruption remains robust to the use of alternative proxies. 
 While we have included an extensive array of control variables, endogeneity, especially 
arising from reverse causality, is likely to be a concern. One might argue that when there is more 
lending corruption in the banking system, managers are more likely to be less timely in loan loss 
provisioning to hide the losses arising from bad loans that are more likely with greater lending 
corruption. In other words, it is not more timely loan loss provisioning that reduces lending 
corruption, but reduced lending corruption increases timely loan loss provisioning. In addition, to 
the extent that we have not controlled for institutional features (e.g., culture) within each country 
that affect both loan loss provisioning timeliness and lending corruption, there could be 
correlated omitted variable biases. 
 To address this concern, we rely on the standard instrumental variable (IV) approach to 
examine whether there is an effect of timely loan loss provisioning on lending corruption. In the 
case of our study, a good instrument is one that is a significant determinant of timely loan loss 
provisioning but that (arguably) does not have a direct effect on lending corruption (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010).  
Some countries allow banks to deduct their loan loss provisions for tax purposes, thereby 
creating an incentive for banks in those countries to provide timely loan loss provisions (Nichols 
et al., 2009). To proxy for tax incentives to provide earlier loan loss provisioning, we argue that a 
banks’ tax incentive for providing timely loss provisioning increases with the corporate tax rate. 
Corporate tax rates are unlikely to be under the direct influence of the bank; this helps to increase 
the validity of the instrument. Furthermore, the corporate tax deductibility of loan loss provisions 
is unlikely to have a direct effect on individual corrupt lending behavior. A review of the 
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literature on lending corruption indicates that no paper has considered that tax rates could be an 
explanation for lending corruption. From a conceptual perspective, finding an instrument that the 
prior literature has not yet considered as an explanatory variable in the second stage regression 
helps to increase the likelihood that the instrument satisfies the exogeneity condition (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). 
To construct the instrument, we use Tax Deductible, which is the corporate tax rate if the 
specific loan loss provision is tax deductible for a particular country and zero otherwise. The 
higher Tax Deductible is, the greater the incentive for banks to record timely loan loss provisions 
for tax purposes. Moreover, the tax feature in a country does not appear to be related to bank 
corruption though channels other than the timeliness of the loan loss provisioning. The 
information on whether loan loss provisions are deductible is gathered from Barth et al. (2006). 
We obtain the average tax rate from KPMG Tax Rate Survey in 2003, IMD World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2000 and the World Bank. To implement the instrumental variables 
approach in an attempt to identify the effect of timely loan loss provisioning, we follow the 
standard two stage least squares (2SLS) regression specification.  
Table 5 presents the results of the 2SLS regressions. In the first stage, we have LLP 
Timeliness as the dependent variable and Tax Deductible as an instrument. Column 1 presents 
the results of the regression. Tax Deductible is significant in the first stage. Column 2 presents 
results of the second stage regression that examines the effect of timely loan provisioning that 
uses the instrumented timely loan loss provisioning variable. The coefficient on this variable is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in the second stage, consistent with more 
timely loan loss provisioning reducing lending corruption. 
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The results of tests of the necessity and validity of the instrumental variable approach are 
provided at the bottom of the table. The test of endogeneity indicates that there is significant 
evidence (F-stat = 5.755) to reject the null hypothesis that LLP Timeliness and Bank corruption 
are exogenous. This result provides support for the use of the instrumental variables approach to 
identify the effect of LLP Timeliness on Bank corruption. Diagnostic tests of the relevance of 
Tax Deductible as an instrument indicate that it is a powerful instrument: the partial R2 is 0.052.  
The F-statistic is statistically significant (F-stat = 5.031).  
In the following sections, we examine our second hypothesis about how market discipline 
could affect the relation between the timeliness of loan loss provisioning and bank corruption. In 
particular, we focus on two important institutional features in the banking systems of many 
countries: deposit insurance and government ownership of the banking system. In H2a, we argue 
that deposit insurance reduces the likelihood of bank runs (a form of market discipline) when 
loan problems are revealed earlier. We hypothesize that more timely loan loss provisioning 
reduces corruption in bank lending less in banking systems that have deposit insurance. In H2b, 
we argue that even if corruption is revealed earlier due to more timely loan loss provisioning, 
greater government ownership in the banking system reduces market discipline by bank investors 
because of implicit government backing. It also reduces the likelihood of punishment being 
meted out to the corrupt bank officers. Hence, we hypothesize that more timely loan loss 
provisioning reduces corruption in bank lending less in countries where the government holds a 
more significant stake in the banking system. 
To examine the role of these institutional features, we modify equation 2 and interact 
LLP Timeliness with a proxy of the institutional feature being examined (Institution): 
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ܤܽ݊݇	ܥ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ߙ ൅	ߚଵܮܮܲ	݈ܶ݅݉݁݅݊݁ݏݏ୲ ൅ ߚଶܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௧ ൅	ߚଷܮܮܲ	݈ܶ݅݉݁݅݊݁ݏݏ୲ ൈ
ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௧ ൅ 	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅	߳௧,          (3) 
where Institution is Deposit insurance in Section 4.2.2 and Government bank ownership in 
Section 4.2.3. Because of the difficulties involved with the interpretation of coefficients on 
interaction terms in non-linear models, we estimate the interactions specification using both an 
ordered probit and an OLS model (Angrist, 2009). 
4.2.2 Deposit insurance (H2a) 
Table 6 presents the results of the analyses of the effect of deposit insurance (Deposit 
insurance) on the relation between bank corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions. 
The coefficient of interest is on LLP Timeliness × Deposit insurance. In the first column with the 
ordered probit regression specification, the coefficient is 2.803 (t-stat = 2.30). In the second 
column with the OLS regression specification, the coefficient is 2.755 (t-stat = 2.50). Hence, 
there is statistically significant evidence that in banking systems with deposit insurance, the 
association between more timely loan loss provisioning and banking corruption is mitigated, 
consistent with H2a.  
Following Barth et al. (2009), we run a probit model (untabulated) where the dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to zero if a firm’s response to the question of lending corruption 
being an obstacle is “no obstacle” and one if the firm’s response is “minor”, “moderate”, or 
“major.” We obtain a negative significant marginal effect of LLP Timeliness (-1.490 with t-stat=-
3.14) and a positive significant marginal effect of the interaction term (1.159 with t-stat=4.331) 
using Ai and Norton’s (2003) approach. To compare the economic effects of deposit insurance, 
having a deposit insurance program in place that can fully compensate depositors reduces the 
impact of LLP Timeliness by 78% (=1.159/1.490).     
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4.2.3 Government ownership of the banking system (H2b) 
Table 7 presents the results of the analyses of the effect of government bank ownership 
(Government bank ownership) on the relation between bank corruption and the timeliness of loan 
loss provisions. The coefficient of interest is on LLP Timeliness × Government bank ownership. 
In the first column with the ordered probit regression specification, the coefficient is 0.034 (t-stat 
= 1.79).29 In the second column with the OLS regression specification, the coefficient is 0.029 (t-
stat = 1.79). Hence, there is statistically significant evidence that in banking systems with higher 
government ownership of the banking system, the association between more timely loan loss 
provisioning and banking corruption is mitigated, consistent with H2b.  
Following Bath et al. (2009), we run a probit model where the dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to zero if a firm’s response to the question of lending corruption being an 
obstacle is “no obstacle” and one if the firm’s response is “minor”, “moderate”, or “major.” We 
obtain a negative significant marginal effect of LLP Timeliness (-0.250 with t-stat=-1.74) and a 
positive significant marginal effect of the interaction term (0.003 with t-stat=2.24) using Ai and 
Norton’s (2003) approach. To compare the economic effects of government bank ownership, 
increasing the government ownership of the banking system by 10% reduces the impact of LLP 
Timeliness by 12% (=0.003*10/0.250). 
4.2.5 Robustness 
 We examine whether our earlier evidence of a negative association between bank 
corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions is robust to variations in the empirical 
design. First, we examine whether the evidence is robust to the inclusion of additional bank 
characteristics as control variables. Next, we control for the composition of the loans held by 
                                                            
29 We exclude the variable Private bank ownership, because the sum of Private bank ownership, Foreign bank 
ownership and Government bank ownership is equal to one.  
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banks. Finally, we examine whether our evidence is robust to the exclusion of firms from 
countries that have a disproportionately large number of firms within our sample, as well as to 
the use of weighted least squares regression (weighted by the number of observations per 
country). Table 8 presents the results of the robustness analyses. 
 For Panel A, we include additional characteristics of the banking system within a country 
to ensure that our results are not driven by an omitted latent variable. Using the data from 
Bankscope, we calculate the means of non-performing loans, capital ratio, earnings before loan 
loss provisioning for each country over 1995-2006 (the same period for which we estimate LLP 
Timeliness). Note that LLP Timeliness is a characteristic of the banking system within a country. 
We continue to find that LLP Timeliness is significantly associated with lower Bank corruption 
when controlling for non-performing loans, capital ratio, earnings before loan loss provisioning, 
and all of these simultaneously.  
 Because the mix of loans could affect the calculation of LLP Timeliness, which is 
reported aggregating all types of loans, we control for the loan mix in Panel B. In column 1, we 
control for the proportion of long-term loans using the within-country averages. In column 2, we 
control for the proportion of loans that are commercial and industrial (C&I loans). Commercial 
and industrial loans for which provisions are made are usually classified as non-performing loans 
in the following period. However, the classification to non-performing is almost immediate for 
personal loans. We continue to find significant results when controlling for these types of loan 
mixes separately and together (column 3). 
 For Panel C, because observations from Russia and Poland make up a significant portion 
(about 13%) of our sample, we ensure that our results are not being driven by the relationship 
between LLP Timeliness and Bank corruption in these countries. Table 8, Panel C shows that our 
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results are robust to the exclusion of observations from Russia and Poland. We also re-estimate 
our results using a weighted least squares specification, weighting by the number of observations 
per country. These results are still significant at the 1% level, and are economically greater than 
in the base specification.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 It is important to control corruption, which is widespread around the world and has 
existed throughout history (Klitgaard, 1988). Corruption imposes a steep cost on society and can 
become normalized in organizations due to reinforcing processes such as institutionalization, 
rationalization, and socialization (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Without proper constraints, 
individuals (and groups of individuals) will be tempted to engage in corruption, and such 
behavior can become so embedded within the organization that it is more or less taken for 
granted and perpetuated. Financial reporting is expected to hold an important disciplining role in 
reducing agency problems. Prior literature examining controls on lending corruption has 
considered external forces but largely ignored the information produced internally by banks. We 
examine whether the timeliness of loan loss provisioning is associated with lending corruption in 
an international setting. Our key result is that lending corruption is lower when loan loss 
provisioning is timelier.  
Prior literature has found that strategies intended to enhance private monitoring of banks 
are more successful in constraining lending corruption than are strategies empowering 
supervisory agencies. Therefore, we examine whether our primary effect is mitigated in 
situations when we expect less market discipline (Beck et al., 2006). Specifically, we consider 
the market discipline imposed on banks by depositors and equity investors. We expect depositors 
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to monitor banks less in the presence of deposit insurance and investors to do the same when a 
significant portion of the banking system is owned by the government because of the implicit 
government support provided. We find that the effect of timely loan loss provisioning on lending 
corruption is mitigated in countries with a deposit insurance scheme and in those where the 
government controls a greater percentage of the banking industry’s assets. 
 We acknowledge that endogeneity is an important concern in establishing that more 
timely loan provisioning indeed has a disciplining effect on lending corruption. In our study, we 
use a wide array of established techniques to deal with this concern. First, we use an extensive 
array of control variables guided by prior literature, particularly prior studies that have looked at 
the determinants of lending corruption. Second, we rely on an instrumental variable approach to 
better establish causality for the proposed relationship. We argue that our instrument, the 
corporate tax rate within a country if the loan loss provision is tax deductible, is likely to meet 
the exclusion requirements for an instrument because corporate tax deductibility is unlikely to 
have a direct effect on the corrupt behavior of individuals. Using 2SLS regressions with this 
instrument, we find that more timely loan loss provisioning reduces lending corruption.  Third, 
we provide cross-sectional analyses to show that the combination of accounting information and 
the likelihood of stakeholders acting on the information is important to financial reporting 
system constraining corruption (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013).  
Finally, our primary results are also robust to controlling for additional country-level variables, 
using alternative measures for the timeliness of loan loss provisioning, and excluding the most 
represented countries from our sample.  While each of the above techniques used to identify the 
effect of timely loan loss provisioning has its limitations, when viewed in aggregate, the results 
lend significant support to our hypothesis that more timely loan loss provisioning reduces 
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lending corruption. However, to the extent that one is still concerned that endogeneity might be 
driving our results and preventing a clear causal inference, we believe our findings are still 
interesting in that they are the first to document an association between timely loan loss 
provisioning and lending corruption. 
To conclude, an important takeaway from our paper is that more timely loan loss 
provisioning, by acting as an early warning mechanism, may have the important ex-ante effect of 
constraining lending corruption. Thus, to the extent that one believes that corruption leads to 
capital allocation inefficiency, one might infer from our results that financial reporting has a role 
in facilitating the efficient allocation of funds by constraining the corruption that enables bad 
firms/projects to obtain debt capital. Future research could investigate whether more timely loan 
loss provisioning by lenders actually leads to firms’ greater investment efficiency and affects 
economic growth.30 
  
                                                            
30  Mauro (1995) finds the degree to which business transactions involve corruption stymies investment and 
economic growth. But the paper does not examine lending corruption specifically and certainly not the timeliness of 
loan loss provisioning. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition Original source 
Bank corruption Firm response to the question, “Is the corruption of bank officials an 
obstacle for the operation and growth of your business?” (1—no 
obstacle, 2—minor obstacle, 3—a moderate obstacle, 4—major 
obstacle.) 
World Business 
Economic 
Survey (WBES) 
(2000) 
   
LLP Timeliness LLP Timeliness is computed following Bushman and Williams (2012). 
We first regress loan loss provisions at time t on change in non-
performing loans at time t+1 and other variables by country: ܮܮ ௧ܲ௝ ൌ
ߛ଴ ൅	ߛଵܧܾ݈݈݌௧௝ ൅	ߛଶΔܰܲܮ௧ାଵ௝ ൅	ߛଷΔܰܲܮ௧௝ ൅	ߛସΔܰܲܮ௧ିଵ௝ ൅
ߛହΔܰܲܮ௧ିଶ௝ ൅	ߛ଺ܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ௝ ൅	ߛ଻ܵ݅ݖ݁௧ିଵ௝ ൅	ߛ଼%Δܩܦ ௧ܲ௝ ൅	߳௧௝.  
LLP Timeliness is the coefficient on the change in non-performing 
loans, ߛଶ, if it is statistically significant, and zero if ߛଶ is insignificant.  
Our calculations 
using 
Bankscope 
   
Public registry Indicator variable equal to one if a public credit registry operates in the 
country by the end of 1999 and zero otherwise. 
Djankov, 
McLeish, and 
Shleifer (2007) 
   
Private bureau Indicator variable equal to one if a private credit bureau operates in the 
country by the end of 1999 and zero otherwise. 
Djankov, 
McLeish, and 
Shleifer (2007) 
   
Firm auditing Indicator variable equal to one if the firm provides its shareholders with 
annual financial statements that have been reviewed by an external 
auditor, zero otherwise. 
WBES (2000) 
   
Private bank 
ownership 
The fraction of the banking system’s assets in the banks that are 50% or 
more owned by private investors. 
Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 
(2006) 
   
Foreign bank 
ownership 
Percentage of bank assets in banks that are a majority foreign owned. 
This was collected from a survey of bank regulators in 2001. 
Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 
(2006) 
   
Government Indicator variable equal to one if any government agency or state body 
has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm and zero otherwise. 
WBES (2000) 
   
Foreign Indicator variable equal to one if any foreign company has a financial 
stake in the ownership of the firm and zero otherwise.  
WBES (2000) 
   
Competitor Number of competitors that the company manager perceives. WBES (2000) 
   
Fair court A firm-level survey indicator measuring the enforceability of a court’s 
decision, increasing in fairness. ‘In resolving a business dispute, do you 
believe your country’s court system to be fair and impartial?’’ (0—
never, 1—seldom, 2—sometimes, 3—frequently, 4—usually, 5—
always. Higher value indicates better court quality.) 
WBES (2000) 
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Law enforcement A firm-level survey indicator measuring the fairness and impartiality of 
a court’s decision, increasing in fairness. ‘In resolving a business 
dispute, do you believe your country’s court system to be decision 
enforced?’’ (0—never, 1—seldom, 2—sometimes, 3—frequently, 4—
usually, 5—always. Higher value indicates better law enforcement.) 
WBES (2000) 
   
General financing 
obstacle 
“How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business?” (1—no obstacle, 2—a minor obstacle, 3—a moderate 
obstacle, 4—a major obstacle.) 
WBES (2000) 
   
Firm size Natural log of firm sales in U.S. dollars. WBES (2000) 
   
Exporter Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is an exporter and zero 
otherwise. 
WBES (2000) 
   
Creditor rights An index which measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy 
defined in laws and regulations, ranging from zero to four, increasing in 
creditor rights. 
Djankov, 
McLeish, and 
Shleifer (2007) 
   
Deposit insurance Indicates whether there is a deposit insurance scheme or whether 
depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed if there is 
no deposit insurance scheme. 
Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 
(2006) 
   
Bank accounting 
disclosure 
Indicates whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid 
interest or principal on performing and non-performing loans and 
whether banks are required to produce consolidated financial 
statements, increasing in the informativeness of the bank account. 
Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 
(2006) 
   
Control of 
corruption 
Indicator measuring the extent to which public power is used for private 
gain, including corruption and the “capture” of the government by elites 
and private interests, increasing in control of corruption. 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 
(2006) 
   
GDP per capita Natural log of gross national product per capita in 1999. World Bank 
(2000) 
   
Inflation Three year average inflation (1998-2000), GDP deflator. World Bank 
(2000) 
   
Government 
effectiveness 
Measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies, increasing in the quality of 
public and civil service. 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 
(2006) 
    
Rule of law The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, 
and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, 
increasing in rule of law. 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 
(2006) 
   
Voice and The extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in Kaufmann, 
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accountability selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
association, and media, increasing in political rights. 
Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 
(2006) 
   
Democracy Indicator variable equal to one if the country was democratic in all years 
between 1950 and 2000. 
Triesman 
(2000) 
   
Openness Imports as a share of GDP in 2000. World Bank 
(2000) 
   
Tax deductible The corporate tax rate if the specific loan loss provision is tax 
deductible for a particular country, zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. 
(2006)/ KPMG 
Tax Rate 
Survey in 2003/ 
IMD World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook 2000 
/World Bank 
   
Government bank 
ownership 
The percentage of the banking system’s assets in banks more than 50% 
owned by the government. 
Barth et al. 
(2006) 
   
Industry Categories We use the variable actdummy in WBES (2000): 1—manufacturing, 
2—service, 3—other, 4—agriculture, 5—construction. If actdummy is 
missing, we use the other variable sector in WBES (2000): 1—
manufacturing, 2—service.  
WBES (2000) 
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Appendix B: Alternative measures of LLP Timeliness and the Instrumental Variable 
                      
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) Country (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Argentina 0.041 0.008 0 Malaysia 0.000 0.002 0.008 28 
Azerbaijan 0.003 0.000 0 Mexico 0.000 0.004 0.031 35 
Bolivia 0.441 0.000               25 Pakistan 0.010 0.002 43 
Bosnia 0.000 0.012 10 Panama 0.017 0.000 0 
Botswana 0.023 0.020 25 Peru -0.105 0.013 0.008 30 
Brazil 0.001 0.002 37 Philippines -0.150 0.026 0.012 0 
Canada 0.000 0.027 0.006 44.6 Poland -0.123 0.026               34 
Chile 0.000 0.003 0.017 15 Portugal 0.000 0.016 0.000 37.4 
Colombia -0.157 0.032 0.090 35 Russia 0.047 0.043 43 
Costa Rica 0.007 0.013 30 Senegal 0.043               33 
Croatia 0.020 0.005 20 Slovakia 0.004               19 
Czech Rep 0.000 0.000 31 Slovenia 0.409               25 
Ecuador 0.006 0.006 15 South Africa 0.001 0.002 35 
El Salvador 0.000 0.021 0.000 25 Spain -0.069 0.001 0.021 0 
Germany 0.005 0.003 51.6 Thailand 0.012 0.003 30 
Ghana 0.002               39.9 Turkey 0.000 0.002 0.024 33 
Honduras 0.001               0 UK 0.000 0.003 0.002 30 
Hungary 0.032 0.000 0 US 0.030 0.000 0.001 0 
India 0.113 0.009 35 Ukraine 0.013 0.004 34 
Italy -0.023 0.009 0.001 37 Uruguay 0.296 0.006 0.000 30 
Kenya 0.000 0.000 49.8 Venezuela -0.360 0.000 0.031 0 
Lithuania   0.002               15   Zimbabwe   0.100 0.000 30.9 
This table presents the three alternative measures of LLP Timeliness and our instrumental variable for each of the 44 countries in our sample. Column 1 is LLP 
Timeliness estimated from 1995-1999. Column 2 is the incremental R2 from adding ΔNPL୲ାଵ୨ to equation (1), capturing the additional explanatory power due to 
adding the one-year-ahead change in non-performing loans. Column 3 is the incremental R2 from adding ΔNPL୲ାଵ୨ to Beatty and Liao’s (2014) loan loss 
provision model (their Table 4, Model (d)). Column 4 is our instrumental variable which is the corporate tax rate if the loan loss provisions (for specific purposes) 
is tax deductible for a particular country and zero otherwise.  
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Table 1: Sample for the estimation of loan loss provision timeliness 
 
This table presents information related to the estimation of the timeliness of loan loss provisions, LLP Timeliness, 
from 1996-2005. We report γ2, LLP Timeliness, and the number of bank-years for each country. LLP Timeliness is 
computed following Bushman and Williams (2012) for each country and then assigned to each firm in our sample. 
We regress loan loss provisions at time t on change in non-performing loans at time t+1 and control variables for 
each country (See equation (1)). LLP Timeliness is the coefficient on change in non-performing loans, γ2, if 
statistically significant and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
 
Country γ2 LLP Timeliness  # Banks   Country γ2 LLP Timeliness # Banks 
Argentina -0.138*** -0.138 125 Malaysia -0.022* -0.022 389 
Azerbaijan 0.039 0 25 Mexico 0.042* 0.042 241 
Bolivia 0.003 0 79 Pakistan -0.044* -0.044 131 
Bosnia 0.022 0 16 Panama 0.109 0 42 
Botswana 0.059* 0.059 23 Peru -0.092*** -0.092 151 
Brazil 0.024* 0.024 336 Philippines -0.062** -0.062 89 
Canada 0.114*** 0.114 189 Poland 0.049** 0.049 80 
Chile -0.092* -0.092 314 Portugal -0.110*** -0.11 196 
Colombia -0.111** -0.111 103 Russia 0.140*** 0.14 102 
Costa Rica 0.037** 0.037 187 Senegal -0.053* -0.053 20 
Croatia 0.054* 0.054 45 Slovakia -0.03 0 18 
Czech Rep -0.01 0 38 Slovenia 0.995*** 0.995 13 
Ecuador -0.046* -0.046 127 South Africa -0.035 0 53 
El Salvador -0.119*** -0.119 104 Spain -0.016* -0.016 383 
Germany 0.014 0 32 Thailand 0.037* 0.037 103 
Ghana -0.053 0 17 Turkey 0.039 0 137 
Honduras -0.012 0 67 U.K. 0.022* 0.022 216 
Hungary -0.077* -0.077 29 U.S. -0.002 0 49627 
India -0.246*** -0.246 260 Ukraine 0.066* 0.066 58 
Italy -0.046*** -0.046 2305 Uruguay 0.050* 0.05 94 
Kenya -0.009 0 154 Venezuela 0.015 0 205 
Lithuania 0.028 0 15   Zimbabwe 0.187*** 0.187 31 
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Table 2: Loan loss provision timeliness, bank corruption, and sample size by country 
 
This table presents information about the mean Bank corruption and the sample size for each of the 44 countries in 
our sample. The sample consists of 3,611 firms included in the World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey. 
Bank corruption is the firm response to the question “Is the corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation 
and growth of your business (1-no obstacle, 2-minor obstacle, 3-a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle).” All 
following analyses are conducted at the firm (borrower or potential borrower) level.  
 
Country Bank corruption # Firms Country Bank corruption # Firms 
Argentina 1.518 85 Malaysia 1.746 59 
Azerbaijan 2.944 90 Mexico 2.011 88 
Bolivia 1.651 86 Pakistan 2.446 74 
Bosnia 1.714 42 Panama 1.407 81 
Botswana 1.178 45 Peru 2.195 87 
Brazil 1.291 79 Philippines 2.200 90 
Canada 1.071 84 Poland 1.390 164 
Chile 1.224 85 Portugal 1.453 75 
Colombia 1.591 88 Russia 1.914 314 
Costa Rica 1.778 81 Senegal 1.647 17 
Croatia 1.827 98 Slovakia 2.040 75 
Czech Rep 1.904 73 Slovenia 1.243 115 
Ecuador 2.663 86 South Africa 1.127 71 
El Salvador 1.728 81 Spain 1.263 76 
Germany 1.516 62 Thailand 3.308 13 
Ghana 1.800 25 Turkey 2.349 126 
Honduras 2.051 39 U.K. 1.045 66 
Hungary 1.528 72 U.S. 1.481 79 
India 1.554 130 Ukraine 1.957 139 
Italy 1.175 57 Uruguay 1.137 73 
Kenya 1.455 44 Venezuela 1.550 80 
Lithuania 2.300 60   Zimbabwe 1.526 57 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the 3,611 firms (from 44 countries) used to examine the relation between 
bank corruption and the systematic timeliness of loan loss provisions. Bank corruption is the firm response to the 
question “Is the corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business (1-no obstacle, 
2-minor obstacle, 3-a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle).” LLP Timeliness is computed following Bushman and 
Williams (2012) for each country and then assigned to each firm in our sample. We regress loan loss provisions at 
time t on change in non-performing loans at time t+1 and control variables for each country. (See equation (1).) LLP 
Timeliness is the coefficient on change in non-performing loans, γ2, if statistically significant and zero otherwise. 
Public registry is an indicator variable, which takes the value one if a public credit registry operates in the country 
by the end of 1999 and zero otherwise. Private bureau is an indicator variable equal to one if a private credit bureau 
operates in the country by the end of 1999 and zero otherwise. Firm auditing is an indicator equal to one if the firm 
provides audited annual financials to its shareholders. Private bank ownership is the percentage of the banking 
system’s assets in banks that are more than 50% owned by private investors. Foreign bank ownership is the 
percentage of the banking system’s assets in banks that are more than 50% owned by foreign investors. Government 
is an indicator variable equal to one if any governmental agency or body has ownership in the firm and zero 
otherwise. Foreign is an indicator variable equal to one if any foreign company or individual has ownership in the 
firm and zero otherwise. Competitor captures the number of competitors the manager perceives. Fair court captures 
the enforceability of court decisions. Law enforcement is measures the impartiality of court decisions. General 
financing obstacle captures how difficult financing is for the operation and growth of the firm. Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of firm sales in US dollars. Exporter is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is an exporter 
and zero otherwise. Creditor rights is an index capturing the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy laws and 
regulations. Deposit insurance is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s country has a deposit insurance 
scheme or if depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed and zero otherwise. Bank accounting 
disclosure is an indicator equal to one if the income statement includes accrued interest or principal on both 
performing and non-performing loans and whether banks must produce consolidated financial statements. Control of 
corruption captures how well corruption is controlled within the country. GDP per capita is the logarithm of gross 
national product per capita in 1999. Inflation is the three year average percentage inflation, GDP deflator. 
Government effectiveness captures the quality of public services, civil service (and its independence from political 
influences), policy formation and implementation, and the government’s commitment to these policies. Rule of law 
captures the extent to which agents have confidence in and follow the rules of society, particularly contract 
enforcement, police, the courts, and the probability of crime. Voice and accountability measures the extent to which 
people are able to select their government officials as well as different freedoms such as expression, association, and 
press. Democracy is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s country was democratic in all years from 1950 until 2000. 
Openness captures imports as a share of GDP in 2000.  
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Variable Mean Std p25 p50 p75 
Bank corruption 1.723 1.032 1.000 1.000 2.000 
LLP Timeliness 0.029 0.195 -0.046 0.000 0.050 
Public registry 0.459 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Private bureau 0.504 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Firm auditing 0.659 0.474 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Private bank ownership 47.670 28.047 17.430 55.700 67.200 
Foreign bank ownership 32.900 28.645 8.800 20.600 46.800 
Government 0.111 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Foreign   0.189 0.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Competitor 2.286 0.720 2.000 2.000 3.000 
Fair court 2.386 1.418 1.000 2.000 4.000 
Law enforcement 2.363 1.410 1.000 2.000 3.000 
General financing obstacle 2.773 1.108 2.000 3.000 4.000 
Firm size 10.265 7.908 1.609 13.122 16.811 
Exporter 0.392 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Creditor rights 1.822 1.101 1.000 2.000 3.000 
Deposit insurance 0.797 0.402 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Bank accounting disclosure 2.757 0.467 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Control of corruption 0.037 0.943 -0.710 -0.240 0.710 
GDP per capita 8.026 1.167 7.193 8.148 8.642 
Inflation 12.496 17.744 2.848 6.274 12.759 
Government effectiveness 0.205 0.825 -0.530 0.120 0.710 
Rule of law 0.034 0.855 -0.740 -0.070 0.540 
Voice and accountability 0.290 0.738 -0.430 0.400 0.960 
Democracy 0.199 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Openness 36.534 19.599 24.034 32.180 45.766 
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Table 4: Bank corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions 
 
This table presents regression results examining the relation between the timeliness of loan loss provisioning and 
bank corruption. Panel A presents the coefficients of the regression. Panel B presents analyses of the economic 
significance of various coefficients. In Panel C, we examine whether our evidence of a negative association between 
bank corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions is robust to the use of alternative measures of timeliness 
of loan loss provisions. Bank corruption is the firm response to the question “Is the corruption of bank officials an 
obstacle for the operation and growth of your business (1-no obstacle, 2-minor obstacle, 3-a moderate obstacle, 4-
major obstacle).” LLP Timeliness is computed following Bushman and Williams (2012) for each country and then 
assigned to each firm in our sample. We regress loan loss provisions at time t on change in non-performing loans at 
time t+1 and control variables for each country (See equation (1)). LLP Timeliness is the coefficient on change in 
non-performing loans, γ2, if statistically significant and zero otherwise. t-statistics are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. The control variables are as previously defined. Standard errors are clustered by 
country. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A: Ordered probit regression 
  Dep=Bank corruption 
(1) (2) 
LLP Timeliness -0.371** 
(2.13) 
Public registry 0.076 0.087 
(0.63) (0.73) 
Private bureau -0.203 -0.230* 
(1.44) (1.67) 
Firm auditing -0.232*** -0.231*** 
(3.46) (3.53) 
Private bank ownership -0.008** -0.007* 
(2.05) (1.88) 
Foreign bank ownership -0.006* -0.007* 
(1.77) (1.83) 
Government -0.177* -0.167* 
(1.88) (1.80) 
Foreign   -0.058 -0.053 
(0.93) (0.86) 
Competitor -0.036 -0.034 
(0.87) (0.83) 
Fair court 0.007 0.008 
(0.39) (0.44) 
Law enforcement -0.115*** -0.113*** 
(5.32) (5.16) 
General financing obstacle 0.225*** 0.224*** 
(10.42) (10.35) 
Firm size 0.007 0.004 
(0.79) (0.44) 
Exporter -0.113* -0.101* 
(1.88) (1.69) 
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Creditor rights -0.133*** -0.131*** 
(3.07) (3.14) 
Deposit insurance 0.364*** 0.321** 
(2.90) (2.57) 
Bank accounting disclosure -0.181** -0.166* 
(2.01) (1.88) 
Control of corruption -0.255 -0.208 
(0.95) (0.77) 
GDP per capita 0.054 0.081 
(0.68) (0.96) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.001 
(0.07) (0.21) 
Government effectiveness 0.129 0.110 
(0.47) (0.40) 
Rule of law -0.018 -0.061 
(0.06) (0.20) 
Voice and accountability -0.297** -0.300** 
(2.37) (2.41) 
Democracy -0.023 -0.010 
(0.15) (0.06) 
Openness 0.009*** 0.009*** 
(3.26) (3.39) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3611 3611 
Number of Countries 44 44 
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.100 
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Panel B: Magnitude of timeliness of loan loss provisions’ effects 
    Bank corruption= 
1 (59.98%) 2 (18.72%) 3 (10.33%) 4 (10.97%) 
no obstacle a minor obstacle a moderate obstacle a major obstacle 
LLP Timeliness 1 standard dev. Increase 0.027 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 
Change from minimum to maximum 0.175 -0.057 -0.053 -0.065 
Private bureau Change from 0 to 1 0.087 -0.029 -0.026 -0.032 
Firm auditing Change from 0 to 1 0.089 -0.028 -0.027 -0.034 
Deposit insurance Change from 0 to 1 -0.118 0.043 0.035 0.039 
Government Change from 0 to 1 0.062 -0.022 -0.019 -0.021 
Foreign   Change from 0 to 1 0.020 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
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Panel C: Alternative measures of LLP Timeliness 
  Dep=Bank corruption 
Incremental 
Without assigning LLP Timeliness Incremental R-Squared 
zero to statistically Estimated  R-Squared from ∆NPLt+1 
insignificant γ2 1995-1999 from ∆NPLt+1 (Beatty and Liao 2014) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alternative Measures -0.283* -1.344*** -1.159** -1.025*** 
 of LLP Timeliness (1.68) (3.90) (2.07) (3.31) 
Public registry 0.083 -0.151** 0.090 -0.091 
(0.69) (2.02) (0.80) (0.52) 
Private bureau -0.221 3.525*** -0.232* -0.331* 
(1.58) (13.15) (1.67) (1.81) 
Firm auditing -0.231*** -0.149* -0.215*** -0.204*** 
(3.52) (1.95) (3.26) (2.89) 
Private bank ownership -0.007* 0.039*** -0.008** -0.008* 
(1.94) (9.52) (2.15) (1.70) 
Foreign bank ownership -0.007* 0.056*** -0.007** -0.007 
(1.84) (11.01) (2.14) (1.42) 
Government -0.170* -0.389* -0.172* -0.133 
(1.83) (1.65) (1.87) (1.58) 
Foreign   -0.055 -0.120 -0.054 -0.087 
(0.88) (0.96) (0.87) (1.27) 
Competitor -0.035 -0.196** -0.032 -0.034 
(0.85) (2.37) (0.78) (0.69) 
Fair court 0.008 0.047 0.011 0.027 
(0.43) (1.10) (0.59) (1.37) 
Law enforcement -0.114*** -0.120** -0.112*** -0.130*** 
(5.19) (2.56) (5.12) (4.81) 
General financing obstacle 0.223*** 0.262*** 0.221*** 0.227*** 
(10.30) (8.04) (10.21) (9.07) 
Firm size 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.018* 
(0.52) (0.19) (0.39) (1.83) 
Exporter -0.105* -0.077 -0.100 -0.073 
(1.73) (0.69) (1.62) (1.08) 
Creditor rights -0.129*** -0.120*** -0.130*** -0.198*** 
(3.03) (3.65) (3.11) (4.84) 
Deposit insurance 0.331*** 1.112*** 0.342*** 0.403*** 
(2.60) (4.65) (2.85) (3.44) 
Bank accounting disclosure -0.169* 0.997*** -0.161* -0.239** 
(1.88) (8.50) (1.84) (2.01) 
Control of corruption -0.222 -1.762*** -0.244 -0.127 
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(0.82) (16.77) (0.94) (0.44) 
GDP per capita 0.077 0.587*** 0.060 0.068 
(0.91) (14.06) (0.78) (0.62) 
Inflation -0.001 0.085*** -0.001 0.005 
(0.16) (16.68) (0.41) (1.39) 
Government effectiveness 0.112 -3.201*** 0.144 0.264 
(0.41) (16.98) (0.54) (1.04) 
Rule of law -0.049 3.381*** -0.044 -0.314 
(0.16) (18.84) (0.15) (0.90) 
Voice and accountability -0.299** 2.031*** -0.281** -0.229* 
(2.39) (20.25) (2.34) (1.87) 
Democracy -0.015 -1.858*** -0.016 -0.160 
(0.10) (20.03) (0.10) (1.02) 
Openness 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.008** 
(3.35) (13.60) (3.29) (2.46) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3611 1544 3611 3030 
Number of Countries 44 18 44 36 
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.139 0.100 0.106 
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Table 5: 2SLS regressions 
 
This table presents the results of the 2SLS regressions used to identify the effect of loan loss provision timeliness on 
bank corruption. The instrument used in the first stage is Tax Deductible, the corporate tax rate in the firm’s country 
if the loan loss provision is tax deductible and zero otherwise. Results of the standard tests of the validity of the 
2SLS approach are reported at the bottom of the table. Bank corruption is the firm response to the question “Is the 
corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business (1-no obstacle, 2-minor 
obstacle, 3-a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle).” LLP Timeliness is computed following Bushman and Williams 
(2012) for each country and then assigned to each firm in our sample. We regress loan loss provisions at time t on 
change in non-performing loans at time t+1 and control variables for each country. (See equation (1).) LLP 
Timeliness is the coefficient on change in non-performing loans, γ2, if statistically significant and zero otherwise. 
The control variables are as previously defined. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote 
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
  LLP Timeliness Bank corruption 
1st stage 2nd stage 
(1) (2) 
Tax Deductible 0.003*** 
(2.83) 
LLP Timeliness -2.976* 
(1.74) 
Public registry 0.036 0.234 
(0.59) (1.35) 
Private bureau -0.108** -0.554** 
(2.13) (2.04) 
Firm auditing 0.022 -0.128* 
(1.10) (1.93) 
Private bank ownership 0.002* 0.002 
(1.70) (0.53) 
Foreign bank ownership -0.000 -0.005 
(0.27) (0.96) 
Government 0.039* 0.028 
(1.69) (0.31) 
Foreign   0.006 -0.001 
(0.79) (0.02) 
Competitor 0.006 0.006 
(0.76) (0.15) 
Fair court 0.005 0.015 
(1.12) (0.83) 
Law enforcement 0.007 -0.059*** 
(1.44) (2.80) 
General financing obstacle -0.005 0.149*** 
(1.12) (6.66) 
Firm size -0.009 -0.027 
(1.57) (1.41) 
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Exporter 0.030 0.007 
(1.51) (0.10) 
Creditor rights 0.016 -0.073 
(0.89) (1.34) 
Deposit insurance -0.100*** -0.262 
(3.05) (1.24) 
Bank accounting disclosure 0.059 0.049 
(1.29) (0.35) 
Control of corruption 0.111 0.314 
(1.65) (0.80) 
GDP per capita 0.106*** 0.293* 
(2.72) (1.79) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.008 
(0.90) (1.40) 
Government effectiveness -0.064 0.024 
(0.59) (0.07) 
Rule of law -0.095 -0.516 
(0.80) (1.01) 
Voice and accountability -0.018 -0.270* 
(0.44) (1.86) 
Democracy -0.033 0.081 
(0.48) (0.32) 
Openness 0.002 0.010** 
(1.48) (2.38) 
Constant -0.889** -0.354 
(2.61) (0.27) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3611 3611 
Number of Countries 44 44 
R-squared 0.522 0.051 
Tests of weak instrument: 
        Partial R-squared 0.052 
        F-statistic 5.031** 
Test of no endogeneity: 
        F-statistic   5.755** 
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Table 6: The role of deposit insurance on the relation between bank corruption and the 
timeliness of loan loss provisions 
 
This table presents the results of the analyses of the effect of deposit insurance on the relation between bank 
corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions (H2a). Bank corruption is the firm response to the question “Is 
the corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your business (1-no obstacle, 2-minor 
obstacle, 3-a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle).” LLP Timeliness is computed following Bushman and Williams 
(2012) for each country and then assigned to each firm in our sample. We regress loan loss provisions at time t on 
change in non-performing loans at time t+1 and control variables for each country. (See equation (1).) LLP 
Timeliness is the coefficient on change in non-performing loans, γ2, if statistically significant and zero otherwise. 
Deposit insurance is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s country has a deposit insurance scheme or if 
depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed and zero otherwise. The control variables are as 
previously defined. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively. 
 
  Dep=Bank corruption 
Ordered Probit OLS 
(1) (2) 
LLP Timeliness -3.175** -3.011** 
(2.55) (2.68) 
LLP Timeliness 2.803** 2.755** 
   ×Deposit insurance (2.30) (2.50) 
Deposit insurance 0.003 -0.083 
(0.02) (0.82) 
Public registry 0.042 0.026 
(0.30) (0.22) 
Private bureau -0.180 -0.225* 
(1.26) (1.88) 
Firm auditing -0.220*** -0.176*** 
(3.40) (3.38) 
Private bank ownership -0.006 -0.003 
(1.58) (1.01) 
Foreign bank ownership -0.006* -0.004 
(1.79) (1.39) 
Government -0.168* -0.100* 
(1.80) (1.76) 
Foreign   -0.044 -0.030 
(0.70) (0.67) 
Competitor -0.035 -0.011 
(0.83) (0.31) 
Fair court 0.008 0.005 
(0.44) (0.40) 
Law enforcement -0.116*** -0.079*** 
(5.22) (4.63) 
General financing obstacle 0.227*** 0.162*** 
(10.85) (8.80) 
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Firm size -0.001 -0.002 
(0.12) (0.23) 
Exporter -0.105* -0.099** 
(1.78) (2.38) 
Creditor rights -0.146*** -0.098*** 
(3.69) (3.18) 
Bank accounting disclosure -0.241** -0.146 
(2.32) (1.65) 
Control of corruption -0.143 0.004 
(0.56) (0.02) 
GDP per capita 0.122 0.091 
(1.32) (1.17) 
Inflation 0.000 -0.001 
(0.07) (0.34) 
Government effectiveness -0.057 0.048 
(0.19) (0.20) 
Rule of law -0.039 -0.176 
(0.13) (0.66) 
Voice and accountability -0.266** -0.234** 
(2.40) (2.40) 
Democracy 0.009 0.022 
(0.05) (0.17) 
Openness 0.009*** 0.006** 
(3.27) (2.57) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3611 3611 
Number of Countries 44 44 
Pseudo or Adj. R-squared 0.099 0.178 
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Table 7: The role of government ownership on the relation between bank corruption and 
the timeliness of loan loss provisions 
 
This table presents the results of the analyses of the effect of government ownership of the banking sector on the 
relation between bank corruption and the timeliness of loan loss provisions (H2b). Bank corruption is the firm 
response to the question “Is the corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your 
business (1-no obstacle, 2-minor obstacle, 3-a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle).” LLP Timeliness is computed 
following Bushman and Williams (2012) for each country and then assigned to each firm in our sample. We regress 
loan loss provisions at time t on change in non-performing loans at time t+1 and control variables for each country. 
(See equation (1).) LLP Timeliness is the coefficient on change in non-performing loans, γ2, if statistically 
significant and zero otherwise. Government bank ownership indicates the fraction of the banking systems assets in 
the banks that are 50% or more owned by the government. The control variables are as previously defined. Standard 
errors are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
  Dep=Bank corruption 
Ordered Probit OLS 
(1) (2) 
LLP Timeliness -0.897** -0.664** 
(2.50) (2.60) 
LLP Timeliness 0.034* 0.029* 
   × Government bank ownership (1.79) (1.79) 
Government bank ownership 0.008** 0.005 
(2.28) (1.49) 
Public registry 0.087 0.084 
(0.79) (0.84) 
Private bureau -0.288** -0.277** 
(1.98) (2.23) 
Firm auditing -0.207*** -0.169*** 
(3.06) (3.06) 
Foreign bank ownership 0.001 -0.000 
(0.41) (0.34) 
Government -0.178** -0.098* 
(1.99) (1.76) 
Foreign   -0.056 -0.040 
(0.89) (0.91) 
Competitor -0.036 -0.010 
(0.87) (0.28) 
Fair court 0.011 0.010 
(0.61) (0.72) 
Law enforcement -0.109*** -0.073*** 
(5.05) (4.52) 
General financing obstacle 0.221*** 0.156*** 
(10.10) (8.46) 
Firm size 0.005 0.003 
(0.52) (0.34) 
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Exporter -0.098 -0.084* 
(1.62) (1.89) 
Creditor rights -0.112*** -0.067* 
(2.65) (1.96) 
Deposit insurance 0.394*** 0.233* 
(2.91) (1.93) 
Bank accounting disclosure -0.162* -0.081 
(1.84) (0.97) 
Control of corruption -0.310 -0.150 
(1.14) (0.70) 
GDP per capita 0.021 -0.002 
(0.23) (0.02) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.003 
(0.46) (0.68) 
Government effectiveness 0.169 0.220 
(0.63) (0.99) 
Rule of law 0.040 -0.102 
(0.13) (0.37) 
Voice and accountability -0.278** -0.221** 
(2.32) (2.05) 
Democracy 0.062 0.103 
(0.39) (0.96) 
Openness 0.008*** 0.005** 
(2.77) (2.45) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3611 3611 
Number of Countries 44 44 
Pseudo or Adj. R-squared 0.101 0.177 
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Table 8: Robustness analyses 
 
This table presents three sets of robustness analyses. In Panel A, we examine whether the evidence is robust to the 
inclusion of additional bank characteristics (aggregated to the country level) as control variables. In Panel B, we 
control for the portion of loans that are long term and that are commercial and industrial. Finally, in Panel C, we 
examine whether our evidence is robust to the exclusion of firms from countries that have a disproportionately large 
number of firms within our sample, as well as to the use of a weighted least squares regression (weighted by the 
number of observations per country). The dependent variable in each regression is Bank corruption, which is the 
firm response to the question “Is the corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your 
business (1-no obstacle, 2-minor obstacle, 3-a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle).” LLP Timeliness is computed 
following Bushman and Williams (2012) for each country and then assigned to each firm in our sample. We regress 
loan loss provisions at time t on change in non-performing loans at time t+1 and control variables for each country 
(See equation (1)). LLP Timeliness is the coefficient on change in non-performing loans, γ2, if statistically 
significant and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Controlling for additional bank characteristics (estimated at country level)   
Non-performing Capital Earnings All of (1), (2) 
Loan Ratio Before LLP and (3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LLP Timeliness -0.410** -0.385* -0.365** -0.432** 
(2.28) (1.93) (2.12) (2.21) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3611 3611 3611 3611 
Number of Countries 44 44 44 44 
Pseudo R-squared 0.102 0.100 0.100 0.102 
Panel B:  Controlling for additional loan composition variables (at the country level) 
Proportion of Proportion of  Both (1) and (2) 
Long-term Loans C&I Loans 
(1) (2) (3) 
LLP Timeliness -0.398** -0.391** -0.409** 
(2.33) (2.20) (2.39) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3611 3611 3611 
Number of Countries 44 44 44 
Pseudo R-squared 0.101 0.100 0.101 
Panel C:  Tests related to uneven representation across countries
Excluding Russia Excluding Poland WLS by # of observations 
(1) (2) in each country 
LLP Timeliness -0.357** -0.349** -0.503*** 
(2.23) (2.08) (2.86) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3297 3447 3611 
Number of Countries 43 43 44 
Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.100 0.086 
 
